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As  the  U.S.  Congress  considers  comprehensive  energy 
policy  and  greenhouse  gas  (GHG)  emissions  regulation 
(Adams, 2009), it is possible that a federal cap-and-trade 
(CAT)  program  could  be  established.  The  impact  that 
CAT would have on the agricultural sector has received in-
creased attention with different views among stakeholders. 
Farmer groups such as the National Farmers Union (NFU) 
have clearly expressed their support for a climate policy, be-
lieving that agriculture is part of a climate change solution 
(National Farmers Union, 2010). Others like the Ameri-
can Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF), however, are more 
concerned about the cost impact on agriculture and have 
remained engaged in the policy debate to assure that any 
final legislation does not diminish American agriculture 
(American Farm Bureau Federation, 2010). Understand-
ing both the opportunities and the challenges that farmers 
would face under GHG CAT becomes critical with im-
pending climate legislation in the United States.
Although GHG CAT implies rising production costs 
for agricultural producers, many agricultural economists 
are optimistic. They believe that the cost impact of a CAT 
climate policy would be limited while its benefits or the 
costs of no action may be more significant. For example, in 
testimony to the House Subcommittee on Conservation, 
Credit, Energy and Research, McCarl (2009) was more 
focused on the opportunities enabled by climate policy, 
expecting that agriculture would benefit even in the ab-
sence of carbon emission offsets. Based on a “back of the 
envelope” calculation that indicated limited benefit and 
cost impacts, Babcock (2009) concluded that any disrup-
tive change in climate would have a far greater impact on 
livelihood than would the carbon price. 
The goal of this paper is to provide a local perspective 
on the possible short-term impact of a CAT climate policy 
on agricultural producers and their potential for adjust-
ment. It summarizes findings of an empirical study focused 
on a region in the Northern Great Plains that explicitly 
considers local farmer behavior with respect to on-farm 
carbon  sequestration  and  production  cost  management. 
While several analyses have developed an overview on the 
agricultural impact of GHG CAT at the national level, this 
empirical study attempts to shed some light on the agri-
cultural potential of adjustment to economy-wide climate 
change mitigation while providing a bottom-up economic 
analysis on some of the short-term costs and benefits to 
agricultural producers in the transition process. 
Economics of the Agricultural Impacts of GHG CAT 
The  relevance  of  GHG  CAT  to  agricultural  producers 
comes mainly from the intensive consumption of energy 
and  energy-related  inputs  in  production  and  its  GHG 
emission profile. Under a CAT regulation, a carbon price 
is introduced to the economy such that energy and other 
energy-related  commodities  that  involve  GHG  emis-
sions in production or consumption will see higher prices 
to cover their carbon costs. To agriculture, rising energy 
prices caused by CAT means higher input prices that in 
turn raise the costs of production. Meanwhile, agricultural 
production can change in response to higher input prices 
to mitigate the production cost impact (Baker et al., 2010). 
Additionally, CAT would likely establish a domestic off-
set market in which capped entities could purchase GHG 
emissions “offsets” from uncapped sectors, such as agricul-
ture. Since agriculture can change its GHG emission pro-
file by shifting land use and practices at relatively low costs, 
it may play an important role in the offset market. 
Economic studies have emerged that examine the im-
plications of a CAT climate policy for agricultural produc-
ers.  Focused on different aspects of possible impacts, these 
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tions on policy and farmer behavior: 
one  with  no  production  changes, 
and subsequent market effects, at all 
under rising input prices (e.g., Do-
ane  Advisory  Services,  2008;  U.S. 
Department  of  Agriculture,  2009), 
and  the  other  considering  market 
competitive  equilibrium  with  com-
plete  production  adjustment  result-
ing from the introduction of GHG 
prices (e.g., Baker et al., 2010). While 
revealing  the  range  of  the  possible 
impacts, all these studies pay less at-
tention to the short-term shock to the 
farm economy, a case falling between 
no  production  changes  and  a  full, 
complete  production  adjustment  at 
new market equilibrium. 
Short-term impacts and the pro-
cess of production adjustment to new 
market equilibrium do matter to agri-
culture, and might be even more im-
portant than the long-term benefits 
themselves to producers. U.S. farm-
ers are typically in their middle ages. 
They  are  risk-averse  in  production 
(Chavas  and  Holt,  1996)  and  may 
not be fully responsive to new policy-
created  market  opportunities  where 
they lack experience or where major 
changes in land use or additional cap-
ital investment would be required in 
spite of uncertain future benefits and 
transaction costs. Relevant examples 
include  carbon  sequestration  and 
converting  conventional  cropland 
to perennial biomass for bio-energy 
feedstock  production.  Indeed,  Mc-
Carl (2009) in his testimony to the 
House  acknowledged  that  adjust-
ment  would  be  needed  for  agricul-
ture to obtain the potential benefits 
brought by CAT climate policy. 
On  the  other  hand,  farmers  are 
sensitive to production cost increases 
and can adjust to a certain degree to 
mitigate any negative impacts caused 
by  biophysical  or  economic  condi-
tions that affect production costs or 
profits.  Farmer  adjustment  to  cli-
mate, environment, policy, and eco-
nomic factors is a fundamental and 
on-going  agricultural  sector  activity 
(Rose and McCarl, 2008). With ris-
ing energy prices, farmers may reduce 
field operations or increase farm ma-
chinery  maintenance  to  cut  energy 
consumption and production expens-
es. While increased production costs 
may be expected resulting from CAT, 
profit-maximizing farmers will adjust 
their production to mitigate the cost 
impacts of carbon prices. 
A Local Perspective with Farmer 
Behavior
To provide a local perspective on the 
short-term impacts of a CAT climate 
policy on farm income, we developed 
an economic analysis that estimated 
the costs and benefits of carbon prices 
to  agricultural  producers  in  North 
Dakota—an  important  agricultural 
production  region  in  the  United 
States. In this study, we considered a 
CAT that  exempts agriculture from 
GHG  emissions  regulation  and  al-
lows  agricultural  producers  to  pro-
vide and sell GHG emissions offsets 
in a carbon market. This study was 
focused  on  two  possible  direct  im-
pacts on net farm income: potential 
revenue  from  carbon  sequestration 
and  rising  production  costs  due  to 
government GHG regulation. It ex-
amined the impacts within the period 
after the carbon price has raised input 
prices as well as production costs but 
before the new market equilibrium of 
agricultural  production  adjustment 
has fully established. 
We  first  calibrated  a  farmer  be-
havior model with respect to carbon 
sequestration based on farmer stated 
preferences  in  a  mail  survey.  The 
survey  questionnaire  was  composed 
of three sections. After a brief intro-
duction, section 1 explicitly elicited 
farmer  willingness  to  participate  in 
four different carbon credit programs 
like  those  administered  by  NFU, 
including conservation tillage, crop-
land  conversion  to  grass,  rangeland 
management, and tree planting. Sec-
tions 2 and 3 contained questions to 
collect information on farmer socio-
economic background, their attitudes 
to  climate  change  and  legislation, 
and  current  production  practices. 
We designed six different versions of 
survey questionnaires to incorporate 
different  levels  of  the  carbon  price 
ranging from $5/metric ton to $70/
metric ton, thus varying profitability 
for carbon program enrollment.  For 
each version of the questionnaire, a 
sample of 500 farmers across North 
Dakota was randomly selected from 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
National  Agricultural  Statistics  Ser-
vice  database  to  receive  the  survey. 
A total of 322 survey questionnaires 
were returned.
On the cost side, we used histori-
cal  observations  to  estimate  farmer 
production costs per acre as a reduced 
function  of  energy  prices.  We  cal-
culated the increase of energy prices 
under  different  carbon  prices  based 
on the carbon content of the energy 
source, assuming the carbon price is 
fully  passed  on  to  consumers.  The 
production  cost  function  in  its  re-
duced  form  captures  farmer  ability 
of production adjustment to mitigate 
the cost impact of rising input prices 
due to carbon pricing. Based on the 
above  models,  a  policy  simulation 
with agricultural census data revealed 
production  cost  impacts,  potential 
carbon  sequestration  revenues,  and 
distributional effects on farm income 
under varying carbon prices.
Table  1  presents  the  production 
cost impact on average for North Da-
kota farms. If the fertilizer industry is 
exempted from GHG regulation, the 
cost impact for a carbon price range 
of $5-65/metric ton will come largely 
from crude oil consumption, with an 
estimated cost increase ranging from 
$0.54/acre to $7.07/acre, a 0.69% to 
9.00% increase relative to the average 
variable production cost for per unit 
land in 2009. Based on a recent EPA 
study of the Waxman-Markey climate 
bill  published  in  June  2009  (U.S. 
Environmental  Protection  Agency, 
2009), the carbon price for 2015 was 
estimated at $12.64/metric ton CO2 
equivalent in 2005 value—$56/met-
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income based on our model simula-
tion  of  farmer  behavior  in  combi-
nation  with  the  2007  agricultural 
census  data.  With  the  fertilizer  in-
dustry  exempted  from  CAT,  Figure 
1 shows that 69% of North Dakota 
farms would be negatively affected by 
GHG CAT for a carbon price at $5/
metric ton. However, the percentage 
of  farms  that  would  lose  falls  with 
increases in carbon prices. For a high 
carbon  price  up  to  $65/metric  ton 
(or  $17.7/metric  ton  CO2  equiva-
lent), only 14% of the farms would 
lose. Figure 1 also shows that the net 
losses suffered by some North Dakota 
farms would be limited compared to 
the gains for other farms that could 
stretch  out  over  a  wide  range.  For 
example, for a carbon price range of 
$5-65/metric  ton,  or  $1.36-17.72/
metric ton CO2 equivalent, the net 
losses for some farms would be less 
than $10/acre, but the net gains for 
other farms would be more than $20/
acre and could reach up to $70/acre 
depending on the carbon price.
Some  caveats  deserve  mention-
ing  for  the  above  results.  First,  the 
production  cost  impact  might  be 
overestimated as it did not consider 
the market equilibrium effect of car-
to be long term. The major purpose 
of  these  programs,  like  their  coun-
terparts for bio-energy, is to stimu-
late  farmer  participation  in  climate 
change  mitigation  while  alleviating 
the  negative  short-term  impact  of 
CAT  before  agricultural  adjustment 
to new market conditions. 
Figure  1  illustrates  the  distribu-
tions  of  the  impacts  on  net  farm 
implied a production cost increase of 
approximately  $6,  a  7.6%  increase 
per acre relative to the 2009 level for 
North Dakota farms.
Table  1  also  calculates  carbon 
emission  offsets  needed  on  a  per 
acre basis for farmers to break even 
with  the  production  cost  increase. 
The existing voluntary carbon credit 
programs managed by the NFU es-
timates an annual carbon sequestra-
tion potential of 0.12 to 0.7 metric 
ton carbon/acre, at least for the North 
Dakota  region  (National  Farmers 
Union, 2009). Compared to the po-
tentially available carbon credits, the 
estimated  break-even  carbon  offsets 
of  0.11  metric  ton  carbon/acre  can 
be  provided  with  some  adjustment 
in production practices. This implies 
that  farmers  can  sequester  carbon 
without necessarily incurring signifi-
cant  opportunity  costs  except  some 
capital  investment  and  transaction 
costs.  Those  private  costs  could  be 
covered by government cost-sharing 
programs similar to those supporting 
biomass  production  for  bio-energy 
in  the  2008  farm  bill.  As  demon-
strated by Baker et al. (2010) farm-
ers would benefit from CAT in the 
long run at market equilibrium, these 
government  programs  do  not  have 
Table 1: Annual Marginal Production Costs of Carbon Prices to Agriculture in 
North Dakota





creditc, metric ton 
carbon/acre
5 0.54 (0.69) 0.11
10 1.09 (1.38) 0.11
30 3.26 (4.15) 0.11
50 5.44 (6.92) 0.11
65 7.07 (9.00) 0.11
a. The estimates of production cost increases did not account for the market 
equilibrium effect of the carbon prices on energy prices and assumed the fertilizer 
industry was exempted from cap-and-trade regulation.
b. The percentages in parentheses are relative to the 2009 annual average of variable 
production costs for per unit land in North Dakota.
c. The break-even carbon credits were calculated by dividing the production cost 
increases by the corresponding carbon prices.
Figure 1: Cumulative Distributions of Marginal Farm Profits under Different 
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bon costs on energy prices. In mar-
ket  equilibrium,  these  costs  will  be 
shared  jointly  by  energy  producers 
and  consumers  including  agricul-
tural producers. Second, the carbon 
sequestration  revenue  was  based  on 
farmer stated preferences for partici-
pating in carbon sequestration, which 
is not necessarily the maximum level 
that can be reached by optimal man-
agement  in  agricultural  production. 
Farmers may do better if they turn 
out to be more active when a pro-
gram is established and the produc-
tion  cost  impact  becomes  a  reality. 
Third,  since  this  study  was  focused 
on the short-term impact, there were 
no long-term market equilibrium ef-
fects  considered  for  the  agricultural 
sector,  which  include  part  of  the 
production cost increase that would 
be passed to consumers, increased de-
mand for bio-energy feedstock, and 
higher commodity prices due to land 
competition, all of which can further 
increase farm income. Fourth, many 
potential  creditable  offset  activities 
such as N2O reductions from altered 
fertilizer management and land set-
asides for carbon sequestration were 
not  considered,  which  limits  profit 





Given its joint benefit in both energy 
security and climate change mitiga-
tion, regulating and reducing GHG 
emissions  represents  an  inevitable 
political choice for the United States. 
Within this context, the best strategy 
for agriculture is to adjust to govern-
ment  climate  policy  by  identifying 
opportunities to mitigate the produc-
tion-cost  increasing  impacts  of  the 
policy. Providing GHG emissions off-
sets is one such opportunity to which 
the  agricultural  sector  should  pay 
close attention. Production of bioen-
ergy feedstocks, while not examined 
in this analysis, presents another miti-
gation activity in agriculture with po-
tential to boost revenues. 
Based on farmer behavior model-
ing with agricultural census data, our 
empirical  analysis  indicates  that:  1) 
the short-term cost impact of a CAT 
climate policy on agriculture is likely 
to be limited; 2) there is large poten-
tial for on-farm carbon sequestration 
that does not necessarily require ma-
jor  land  use  shifts;  and  3)  revenue 
from carbon sequestration may more 
than offset the production cost im-
pact of carbon pricing such that the 
majority  of  agricultural  producers 
will  gain  from  CAT  with  increased 
farm  income,  particularly  for  high 
carbon prices.
However,  institutions  and  poli-
cies  with  government  assistance  are 
needed to help agriculture adjust to 
societal  climate  change  mitigation. 
First, as carbon sequestration is a new 
concept, better education and exten-
sion programs are needed to help ag-
ricultural producers understand and 
identify carbon sequestration poten-
tial of their land. Indeed, from our 
farmer  preference  survey,  we  found 
that farmers were biased against par-
ticipating in carbon credit programs 
due mainly to concerns over regula-
tion on farm management. Second, 
the  U.S.  government  needs  to  de-
velop rules and standards that could 
facilitate measurement and certifica-
tion of GHG emissions offsets and 
that would reduce transaction costs, 
thereby  encouraging  farmer  partici-
pation. Third, as capital investment 
can be a major obstacle for farmers to 
adopt  carbon-sequestering  practices, 
government assistance to share some 
of  the  cost  would  encourage  wider 
participation  in  carbon  credit  pro-
grams. 
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